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The G20 Africa Partnership Conference and the AU–EU Summit, as well as 
the headlines related to African migrants in North Africa, put the African 
continent into the spotlight last year. Popular protests challenged various 
autocratic rulers, and the former liberation movements of Southern Africa 
faced their own struggles. These ambiguities in the continent’s political, 
economic, and social development will remain apparent in events that we 
deem critical for the region in 2018. 
 • The reform of the African Union (AU) will be piecemeal rather than profound. 
Many AU member states will resist AU chairman Paul Kagame’s push for policy 
implementation and the strengthening of the AU Commission. 
 • The year 2018 is unlikely to be a good one for democracy in Africa. The sched-
uled elections are unlikely to provide more democratic space. They will take 
place in fragile contexts, including Mali and South Sudan, or in hybrid and au-
thoritarian settings. Authoritarian tendencies will continue to be evident in fur-
ther attempts to abolish presidential term limits in several countries. 
 • South Africa and Nigeria will be preparing for national elections in 2019. In 
Nigeria, the run-up to the elections might incite violent conflict and create polit-
ical stasis, while South Africa’s new president, Cyril Ramaphosa, needs to fight 
corruption and revive the economy. The Central African Republic (CAR) and 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) will remain conflict hotspots. Rad-
ical Islamist groups remain particularly active in Mali, Somalia, and Nigeria. 
The weakening of these groups may increase their recourse to terrorist tactics.
 • The future relationship between Europe and Africa will be shaped by the post-
Cotonou agreement. A bumpy start to formal negotiations is likely to lie ahead 
because of the Europeans’ emphasis on the political sphere and the lack of an 
“African position.” Key matters for many African governments are trade relation-
ships, recent initiatives such as the Compact with Africa, and migration policies.
Policy Implications
Our selective account of “ten things to watch in Africa” is on balance sceptical 
about the continent’s political prospects in 2018. This is despite ongoing socio-
economic progress in many parts of Africa. Not all the dim prospects have to 
materialise if action is taken by African rulers and populations, as well as by 
Africa’s partners – particularly the EU. Among the more daring options for 
Euro pean policymakers would be a renegotiation of the European–African trade 
deals and legal migration pathways under a post-Cotonou agreement.
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1 Kagame’s Push for an Effective African Union 
The year 2018 will be a decisive one for the further development of the AU. The 
organisation’s new chairman, Rwandan president Paul Kagame (elected for one 
year), is pursuing an ambitious agenda focused on strengthening both the organi-
sation and continental integration more broadly. In his report “The Imperative to 
Strengthen Our Union,” which he presented in January 2017, Kagame came to the 
drastic conclusion that “the unfortunate truth is Africa today is ill-prepared to ad-
equately respond to current events” and that the “chronic failure to see through 
African Union decisions has resulted in a crisis of implementation” (Kagame 2017: 
2, 4). The key problems he identified were the AU’s overdependence on donor fund-
ing – external funds finance 97 per cent of the AU’s programmes – and a failure to 
set priorities. “As a result, we have a dysfunctional organisation in which member 
states see limited value, global partners find little credibility, and our citizens have 
no trust” (Kagame 2017: 5). 
Based on this assessment, Kagame reaffirmed his institutional reform plan at 
the 30th AU Summit in Addis Ababa in January 2018. Essentially, these reforms 
would give the AU Commission a stronger role vis-à-vis the member states and 
would streamline decision-making and the organisational structure – for instance, 
by fully integrating the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) into the 
AU Commission and making it the AU development agency, as well as by increasing 
pressure on member states that do not implement decisions made at the AU level. 
Continental integration in Africa has, like that in other world regions, always 
been driven by individual political leaders such as South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki, Ni-
geria’s Olusegun Obasanjo and – for better or worse – Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, 
who disproportionally financed the AU’s initiatives. However, the muted reactions 
to Kagame’s plans reveal the deep divisions among the member states regarding 
the AU’s future path. For instance, member states of the Southern African Develop-
ment Community (SADC) have complained openly about the legality of the reform 
process and the 0.2 per cent levy to be placed on imports to fund the organisation 
(ISS Africa 2018). The conflict boils down to the fundamental question of  whether 
the AU should continue to be an organisation driven by and dependent on its mem-
ber states or whether it should be a commission-steered body with a strong supra-
national character. Given the strong disagreements about the way forward, it is 
likely that, despite President Kagame’s characteristically forceful efforts, his com-
prehensive plans will go nowhere in 2018. Piecemeal changes and a continued mud-
dling through represent the most likely scenario. Only if continental regulations 
clearly serve the majority of member states’ interests – such as the strong continen-
tal provisions against coups d’états – can we expect decisive action. 
A key aspect to watch is therefore the organisation’s peace and security reform, 
one of the areas where the AU has been most active. The AU is seeking to strengthen 
funding for its peace activities in order to realise its ambitious goal of “silencing the 
guns” across the continent by 2020. In 2015, the AU Assembly decided to take fi-
nancial responsibility for 25 per cent of the cost of peace activities on the African 
continent by 2020 (excluding the African Union Mission in Somalia, AMISOM). The 
key instrument for collecting and distributing these funds is the AU Peace Fund. 
However, initial efforts have seen limited success. According to Donald  Kaberuka, 
high representative for the fund, as of May 2017 only 14 AU member states had made 
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contributions to the fund, accounting for 12 per cent of the USD 65 mil lion target 
for 2017 (United Nations 2017). It is therefore highly doubtful that the AU payment 
targets will be met in the near future.
2 Democracy in Africa: Demands Remain Unmet
The majority of the Africans surveyed by Afrobarometer prefer democracy to any 
other kind of government (Mattes and Bratton 2016: 5). Given the high level of 
popular demand, it is worth asking whether Africans will get what they want in 
2018. The upcoming polls will take place in tough settings that preclude showcase 
democratic elections. Election organisation in Mali and South Sudan will face ser-
ious security threats, while Sierra Leone is still suffering from the after-effects of 
the Ebola epidemic. In Cameroon and the DRC, citizens will cast their vote in full-
fledged authoritarian regimes, which are seeking legitimation through the ballot 
box. If Zimbabwe’s new president Emmerson Mnangagwa successfully manages the 
ZANU-PF’s ability to manipulate elections and the opposition cannot find an ad-
equate replacement for its icon Morgan Tsvangirai, the elections in Zimbabwe will 
be marked by the continuation of authoritarianism. In Madagascar, the prospect 
of a second election after the country’s return to constitutional order will generate 
political intrigue and instability if incumbent Hery Rajaonarimampianina strives to 
disqualify his main contenders: former president Marc Ravalomanana and former 
coup leader Andry Rajoelina. This year’s elections are thus unlikely to bring about 
democratic change. 
At the same time, the limbo regarding presidential term limits continues. Zam-
bia’s Edgar Lungu is seeking a Constitutional Court ruling that would allow him 
to vie for a third term in 2021. He has already threatened judges not to obstruct 
his third-term bid, and further pressure on the judiciary is to be expected. Togo’s 
incumbent Faure Gnassingbé has opted for a more subtle approach: a presidential 
term limit without a retroactive clause, which would allow him to stay in power 
until 2030, is expected to be approved by popular referendum despite increasing 
protest from the opposition. These developments constitute another setback with 
respect to term limits in Africa. 
In the past, civil society has successfully mobilised against the removal of term 
limits and other threats to democracy. However, civil society organisations are fa-
cing increasing restrictions. These include burdensome registration and reporting 
obligations; the prohibition of foreign funding; and outright assaults on the free-
dom of opinion and assembly in countries ranging from Burundi to Ethiopia,  Kenya, 
Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. It seems improbable that this trend will be reversed in 
2018, when elections in hybrid or outright authoritarian settings will provide an 
ideal breeding ground for restrictions on regime-critical actors. Hence, 2018 will be 
yet another year in which Africans’ demands for democracy will be disappointed.
3 South Africa’s Turn under President Ramaphosa
Although South Africa has retained its post-apartheid position as regional hege-
mon, it is in the midst of a long period of political and economic crisis that is un-
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likely to end soon. Over the past two decades, the official unemployment rate has 
hovered around 25 per cent, hitting a 14-year high of 27.7 per cent in 2017. Youth 
unemployment (15–24 years) has seen only a modest decline from 54.2 per cent in 
the third quarter of 2016 to still a staggering 52.2 per cent in 2017 (Stats SA 2017). 
A highly politicised and sensitive matter to watch in South Africa in 2018 is the fu-
ture of land reform. The topic is of immense symbolic significance due to apartheid 
policies of race-based land dispossession, and the ANC’s recent push to amend the 
constitution to allow the state to confiscate land without compensation – if written 
into law – would come with significant economic risk. 
The large number of, often violent, protests demonstrates the deep rifts within 
South African society, as well as the frustration with the slow pace of economic trans-
formation and the lack of government action. However, the country’s pressing socio-
economic problems have received far less attention than the lengthy political drama 
surrounding attempts by the new ANC leader, Cyril Ramaphosa, to force state presi-
dent Jacob Zuma to resign, which Zuma finally did on 14 February 2018. Ramaphosa, 
the new president, has been portrayed in the media as a reformer and is popular with 
the business community and the ANC’s pro-market faction; however, he will likely 
be greeted with hostility by the left and the ANC’s governing alliance partners: the 
South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU). While the ANC is almost certain to win the next election in 2019, 
the former liberation movement must secure more than 50 per cent of the votes to 
continue to dominate the political scene. Much will depend on the new president’s 
actions. Widespread infighting and allegations of pervasive state capture have dealt 
a serious blow to the ANC’s popularity. Ramaphosa made fighting corruption and 
economic reform the centrepiece of his intra-ANC election campaign. His minister-
ial appointments and his first moves in office have been applauded by important 
sections of the media and the general public alike. Yet he only narrowly won against 
his main rival, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. How much of his agenda Ramaphosa will 
be able to implement through effective socio-economic policies also depends on the 
extent to which he is able to tame intra-party factionalism and strife. 
4	 Nigeria’s	Difficult	Pre-Election	Year
Nigeria’s sociopolitical and economic trajectory in 2018 will be defined by the political 
tension and instability that will inevitably accompany the run-up to the 2019 general 
elections. Elections in Nigeria are usually characterised by intense struggles among 
political actors from various societal groups, and sometimes entire communities are 
dragged into the struggle since elections are seen as the only real opportunity to effect 
socio-economic and political change. The party primaries will commence in August 
2018, followed by the political campaigns in November 2018. Given the increased 
liberalisation of Nigeria’s media landscape, political campaigns are now more often 
laced with hate and inflammatory speech. During the 2011 and 2015 general elections, 
social media was largely misused as a vehicle for spreading false information and in-
citing violence. This will also likely be the case ahead of the 2019 elections. 
Communities that feel alienated by the current Buhari administration may take 
extreme measures to either reject the government or grab its attention. The militant 
groups in the Niger Delta will disrupt the ongoing ceasefire arranged between the 
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insurgents and the government in mid-2016. Similarly, the separatist movement in 
the south-east, which was suppressed by military action in mid-2017, may resur-
face. The Independent People of Biafra (IPOB) had threatened to stop an off-cycle 
governorship election in Anambra State in November 2017, but a show of force by 
the Nigerian military forced them to retreat. It is likely that the group will regroup 
and attempt to prevent people from participating in the “Nigerian” elections. In 
north-central Nigeria, clashes between Fulani herdsmen and local farmers, which 
clearly stem from a resource conflict, may escalate into political confrontation be-
tween supporters of President Buhari and those who oppose him for doing little or 
nothing to protect the local farmers. The tensions in various parts of Nigeria may 
also distract the government from its fight against the Boko Haram insurgents in 
the north-west, giving the latter more space to regroup and continue their attacks.
The pre-election tensions and instability will have profound effects on the Ni-
gerian economy. Experts predict that the economy will record more than 2 per cent 
growth in 2018, consolidating the recovery that began in 2017. But this growth will 
be offset by a decline in foreign investment as a result of heightened insecurity 
and uncertainty regarding government policies. As political tensions increase in 
advance of the 2019 general elections, attacks on oil and gas facilities in the Niger 
Delta, the disruption of commercial activities in the south-east, and the destruction 
of farmlands in the northern regions could all threaten the country’s slow economic 
recovery. As a pre-election year, 2018 will be a defining one for Nigeria. How the 
country’s political actors resolve their differences during this time will be vital in 
determining the prospects for peace and development.
5 Continued Troubles in the DRC 
The DRC continues to be troubled in 2018. As in 2017, the prospect of general elec-
tions is casting a shadow over the country. These elections were originally sched-
uled for 27 November 2016, but have been repeatedly delayed by the government. 
Currently, 23 December 2018 has been set as the new date, although it remains 
doubtful that the process will go ahead as anticipated. According to the country’s 
constitution, the current president, Joseph Kabila, reached the end of his second 
and final term in office on 20 December 2016. Yet the government continues to 
find reasons to delay the elections, such as the absence of a voter register and oth-
er organisational obstacles. The government has not implemented the mediated 
2016 agreement between it and the opposition parties, and the influential Catholic 
Church withdrew from its role as mediator in March 2017. At the same time, Kabila 
and his extended family are benefiting tremendously from their access to the DRC’s 
valuable resources. Since Kabila came to power in 2001, the Kabila family has man-
aged to create a system that controls the vast majority of the country’s resource-
producing and resource-processing companies. Thus, the prospect of losing control 
over these industries might be the real reason for the delay in holding elections. 
The opposition holds a similar opinion, and it is supported by the majority of 
the population. People have taken to the streets to call for elections and Kabila’s 
resignation. But the political landscape is highly fractionalised – there are 278 pol-
itical parties registered in the country – and political elites are divided over the 
question of Kabila’s succession. This division was further aggravated by the death 
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of long-time opposition leader Étienne Tshisekedi on 1 February 2017. His son Felix 
succeeded him as the leader of one of the biggest opposition parties, the Rassemble-
ment Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD), but this only led to the Rassemblement’s 
further disintegration. 
In addition, violence continues in other parts of the country, such as Tanganyi-
ka, North Kivu, and Kasai provinces. In Kasai, a violent armed conflict broke out be-
tween the Kamuina Nsapu militia and government forces in 2016. The conflict was 
fuelled by the lack of acceptance and subsequent killing of the hereditary chief of 
the Bajila Kasanga chieftaincy (HIIK forthcoming). The violence further escalated 
in 2017, and while the conflict is currently contained to parts of the Kasai and Kasai 
Central provinces, a renewed escalation is not unlikely. Given the fact that govern-
ment forces only control parts of the DRC, and themselves often carry out violence 
against civilians (Baaz and Stern 2010), we can expect continued armed conflict in 
different parts of the country. 
In the coming months, it can be expected that the government will try to fur-
ther delay the elections, and that there will be more violent demonstrations by the 
opposition and the population. In addition, the conflicts in the DRC will further 
obstruct the state- and institution-building efforts that are so urgently needed in 
the country. International and bilateral donors can only continue to pressure the 
government to carry out democratic reforms, although the past has shown that ac-
cess to resources in the DRC is often more important to international actors than 
the will of the people.
6 The Crisis in the CAR: From Bad to Worse
In the CAR, there is a risk that the conflict will take a turn for the worse. While a 
massive international peacekeeping intervention and relatively free and fair parlia-
mentary and presidential elections in 2016 briefly reduced violent conflict, violence 
has recently been on the rise again (de Vries & Glawion 2015). Three key factors 
should be monitored over the coming year to find avenues for halting the on going 
escalation: First, armed groups are consolidating and gaining new members as they 
become engulfed in territorial and economic struggles. Attacks by one armed group 
for territorial or economic gain are often punished in a xenophobic fashion, with 
retaliation targeting the wider social group from which the initial actor allegedly 
originated. Put bluntly, auto-defence groups have pursued Muslims in their liv-
ing quarters following attacks by ex-Séléka forces (who are deemed the “Muslim” 
rebels), and self-acclaimed Fulani protection groups have attacked whole villages 
after cattle have been stolen. The economic and social dimensions are increasingly 
creating a dangerous mix, which is ready to explode. 
Second, the international peacekeeping mission is increasingly retreating to its 
bases to avoid becoming involved in everyday security matters and to prevent its 
own troops from committing sexual abuse. However, it has thereby become not 
only inefficient in combatting increasing armed group violence, but also increas-
ingly opaque (Lombard 2016). This opaqueness allows rumours regarding its “true” 
intentions to flourish amongst an aggrieved populace that increasingly sees the 
peacekeepers as a party to rather than an arbiter of fighting. Demonstrations and 
even attacks against peacekeepers have risen steeply over the last year. Only a de-
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cisive turn towards the deep embeddedness of troops using a clear communication 
strategy can change this trajectory.
Finally, the democratically elected government has broken with its self-estab-
lished principle of barring politico-military entrepreneurs from entering political 
office. Last September, President Touadéra reshuffled both the cabinet and the pre-
fectural appointees and included many armed group representatives and military 
officials. Whether the co-optation of armed groups and the militarisation of the 
very weak state in the country’s troubled peripheries will appease tensions remains 
to be seen. Similar moves on the part of former governments failed to calm rising 
violence (Käihkö and Utas 2014). 
To counter these escalatory trends, international policymakers need to reduce 
incentives for violent action, such as allegedly lucrative disarmament packages or 
government portfolios for rebels. People on the ground most urgently desire cred-
ible security and justice provision. Security in the short run must be provided 
via the deeper involvement of intervening troops, with slow reactions or inaction 
during attacks on civilians considered a reason to disqualify contingents. Justice 
should be provided by ensuring the deployment of civil state institutions to the 
periph eries and the strengthening of non-state justice mechanisms in these areas. 
Until recently the CAR was seen as a promising case, ready to end its conflict; how-
ever, opportunities for conflict resolution were not utilised. This means that in 2018 
many changes will need to take place simply to avoid an escalation of violence.
7	 Religious	Conflict	on	the	Rise
For decades, sub-Saharan Islam and other religious traditions have been relatively 
politically tolerant and peaceful. However, recent decades have seen a dramatic rise 
in armed conflicts with religious overtones in sub-Saharan Africa. Many if not most 
have involved extremist forms of Islam. While war-torn Sudan has long been ruled 
by Islamists, there are currently three other hotspots of violent Islamist rebellion 
in sub-Saharan Africa. None are confined to the countries they emerged from, but 
have instead spilled over to neighbouring countries. They are also at least partially 
connected through Islamist ideology and international networks headed by Al- Qaida 
and the Islamic State.
The most long-standing Islamist conflict has been in Somalia. The Al-Shabaab 
group still controls large parts of the country, and AU peacekeepers have been 
struggling to defeat them. Unintended side effects of the AU engagement have 
included terrorist attacks in peacekeeper-sending countries such as Uganda and 
Kenya. Another Islamist hotspot is the Sahel, with Mali as its epicentre. Since the 
French-led intervention in early 2013, Islamist rebels have lost control over ter-
ritory, but attacks have occurred on a regular basis. Neighbouring countries such 
as Mauritania, Chad, Burkina Faso, and Niger are at risk as well. And while Boko 
Haram has been on the retreat within Nigeria in recent years, the conflict with the 
group has spilled over into Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. Terrorist attacks against 
civilians have recently intensified.
The growing weakness of all these groups in the three hotspots is little reason to 
rest easy. These groups’ loss of ground in conventional military terms has increased 
the risk of terrorist attacks – which are easier for the Islamists to stage and signal 
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that they are not yet defeated. Rampant corruption among elites and their failure 
to provide public goods makes parts of the population vulnerable to radicalisation 
through divisive ideology. Islamist attacks on Christians in religiously diverse coun-
tries – and retaliation for these attacks – are creating a growing risk of interreli-
gious tensions. Almost all countries on the west and east coasts of Africa as well as 
in north-central sub-Saharan Africa have mixed Christian and Muslim populations 
and could therefore lapse into violence.
8	 A	Bumpy	Start	to	the	Official	Post-Cotonou	Negotiations
The relationship between the EU and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) 
Group of States will reach a crossroads in 2020, when the Cotonou Agreement, 
established in 2000, expires. While the future of ACP–EU relations has already 
sparked heated debates for a number of years, official negotiations on the “post-
Cotonou” partnership are due to start before September 2018. This year will set the 
tone for the negotiations and provide hints as to whether a substantive agreement 
that reconfigures the Africa–Europe relationship can be reached by 2020. 
To make this happen, a strong “African position” is needed; this, however, is 
not visible. A role for the AU in the process might be helpful but is complicated 
by the potentially divergent views of the different regional economic communities 
(RECs) and the fact that the AU also represents the non-ACP North African coun-
tries. It is our perception that the African debates regarding EU–Africa relations are 
dominated by the economic issues, in particular the Economic Partnership Agree-
ments (EPAs), which are the trade deals between the EU and Africa. Further, migra-
tion ranks high in public and policy debates, as does, to a lesser extent, development 
cooperation – for example, the German “Marshall Plan.” Clearly, the role of China 
in Africa also has repercussions for how Africans and African leaders see relation-
ships with Europe.
On the European side, the European Commission published its recommenda-
tion for a renewed Partnership Agreement in December 2017. It advocates an um-
brella document – which defines common values, principles, essential elements, and 
interests and could be extended to non-ACP countries – with three regional pillars 
that build on existing strategies and define priorities for each region. For Africa, key 
focus areas would include peace and stability, democracy and good governance, eco-
nomic and human development, migration, and climate change. The Commission 
does not appear to envision a major role for the AU in a post-Cotonou agreement.
This constellation, with little positioning on the African side and the vision of a 
comprehensive agreement that covers many areas on the European side, makes for 
dire expectations for the start of the negotiations. Neither the Cotonou Agreement 
nor the Joint Africa–EU Strategy (JAES) signed in 2007 succeeded in substantially 
strengthening political cooperation. The prospect of renegotiating the EPAs in the 
post-Cotonou context would probably increase African interest in the negotiations, 
particularly on the part of the RECs. However, Brussels has shown very little inter-
est in opening up that avenue, despite some signals from Chancellor Merkel that the 
EPAs may not be set in stone. 
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9 High Expectations: The “Compact with Africa”  
 and the “Marshall Plan”
The G20 Africa Partnership Conference in June 2017 in Berlin marked the launch 
of the “Compact with Africa” (CWA) initiative, which aims to increase private and 
infrastructure investment in Africa. Further, the German Ministry of Economic 
Cooperation and Development’s “Marshall Plan with Africa” received a great deal 
of attention in Africa – probably more because of the unfortunate name than the 
content. Technicalities aside, the key issue for both initiatives in 2018 will be to 
maintain the momentum of 2017 and translate words into action. Despite difficult 
circumstances, there are some signs of progress.
The Argentine presidency of the G20 has not prioritised Africa – even though 
it promised to follow up on the G20–Africa partnership. The CWA initiative has 
now been taken up by 10 African countries, up from the initial five. These countries 
are working with the African Development Bank (AfDB), the World Bank, and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to draft investment compacts. Once these com-
pacts are made public we will have initial evidence as to whether the concerted ef-
fort of the G20 and the multilateral development banks can actually attract enough 
interest to mobilise more private and infrastructure investment. This will depend 
critically on whether the compact initiative is able to align investor interests with 
the investment needs of African countries: on the one hand, long-term commitment 
is required for many infrastructure projects; on the other, it may prove difficult to 
find investors for relatively small and high-risk projects.
Putting the “Marshall Plan with Africa” into practice is part of the recently ne-
gotiated CDU/CSU and SPD coalition agreement, but concrete steps can be expected 
only once the new German government has been formed. The G20 and Germany, in 
particular, have raised expectations regarding engagement with Africa. In 2018, they 
will have to prove that they can meet these higher expectations.
10 European Migration Policy towards Africa:  
 Still Stumbling Forward 
Migration issues are a key concern for both African and European decision-makers, 
and EU migration policies have strong repercussions for the African continent. How-
ever, the EU member states remain split in their approaches towards flight and mi-
gration: while the Visegrad Group comprising Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the 
Czech Republic bluntly refuses to accept significant numbers of refugees, the recent 
German coalition talks were characterised by discussions about upper limits for refu-
gees and the right to family reunification. The EU Commission has recognised that 
migration will remain an issue for the years to come and has presented an optimistic 
roadmap that promises “a comprehensive agreement by June 2018 on how to pursue 
a sustainable migration policy.” The approach rests on three pillars: (1) supporting 
the most exposed EU member states, (2) strengthening the protection of Europe’s 
external borders, and (3) cooperation with partner countries to fight the root causes 
of flight and to enhance border management. Regarding Africa, the Commission 
plans to reinforce its strategic partnership with the AU and the implementation of 
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projects under the EU external investment plan. It also plans to curb migration by 
fostering sustainable development, enhancing peace and security, and supporting 
good governance. These measures reflect traditional forms of European commitment 
in Africa, with two exceptions: improving migration management and – potentially a 
landmark decision – disrupting the business models of human traffickers by opening 
up safe and legal pathways for those in need of protection. At present, the reality on 
the ground looks different:
The number of refugees and migrants arriving in Europe by sea via Africa had 
decreased from 360,000 in 2016 to 160,000 in 2017, but according to the Inter-
national Organization for Migration (IOM), January 2018 saw 246 lives lost in the 
Mediterranean. Reports about slave markets in Libya shocked the international 
public and many policymakers and resulted in an EU action plan that includes the 
voluntary repatriation of some 30,000 vulnerable African migrants and the provi-
sion of assistance to 20,000 migrants in Libyan detention centres through IOM and 
the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR). However, at the same time the EU is trying to 
improve border management by training Libyan coastguards, which are infamous 
for their warlord-like behaviour (Tory-Murphy 2017), and it continues to cooperate 
with dictators such as Sudan’s Omar Al-Bashir, whose militias are hunting down 
refugees in the name of better migration management (Chandler 2018). It remains 
questionable whether the EU roadmap will lead to the promised agreement between 
its deeply divided member states. Those who want to completely block the entry of 
African (and other) migrants have been shaping the debate in a way that leaves only 
limited hope that the EU will in fact establish legal pathways for refugees in need 
of protection and a system of granting work visas for temporary labour migrants. It 
is also unlikely that the EU will put pressure on autocratic leaders in Africa, whose 
policies have increased flight and outmigration.
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